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An epistemic model of the uncertainty associated with vague concepts is introduced.
Label semantics theory is proposed as a framework for quantifying an agent’s uncertainty
concerning what labels are appropriate to describe a given example. An interpretation
of label semantics is then proposed which incorporates prototype theory by introducing
uncertain thresholds on the distance between elements and prototypes for description
labels. This interpretation naturally generates a functional calculus for appropriateness
measures. A more general model with distinct threshold variables for different labels is
discussed and we show how different kinds of semantic dependence can be captured in
this model.
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1. Introduction
Natural language is a powerful, ﬂexible and robust mechanism for communicating ideas, concepts and information. Yet
the meaning conveyed by even simple words is often inherently uncertain. This uncertainty is reﬂected in the variation and
inconsistency in the use of words by different individuals. For example, Parikh [30] reports an experiment where a sample
of people are shown a chart with different coloured squares and asked to count the number of red and the number of
blue squares. The results differ signiﬁcantly across the group. Similar inconsistencies in the use of colour categories are also
described in the work of Belin and Kay [1] and Kintz et al. [20]. We believe that this uncertainty about the appropriate use
of words arises as a natural consequence of the distributed and case-based manner by which an understanding of language
is acquired.
Language is, to a large degree, learnt through the experience of our interactions with other speakers from which we
can make inferences about the implicit rules and conventions of language use [29]. Exposure to formal grammar rules and
explicit dictionary deﬁnitions comes relatively late in our education and requires a priori a basic vocabulary on the part of
the student. It is perhaps not surprising then that such a process results in signiﬁcant semantic uncertainty. We cannot real-
istically expect that the boundaries of linguistic concepts, as perhaps represented by their extensions in a multi-dimensional
conceptual space [11], should be precisely and unambiguously deﬁned by a ﬁnite set of often conﬂicting examples. It is
our view then, that the uncertainty about word meanings which naturally result from such an empirical learning process is
the underlying source of concept vagueness. Consequently we adopt an epistemic perspective on vagueness, to some extent
in accordance with the views of Williamson [37], whereby crisp concept boundaries are assumed to exist but where their
precise deﬁnition is uncertain. Furthermore, as pointed out by Parikh [29,30], empirical learning requires extrapolation from
previously encountered examples of word use to other new but similar cases. Hence, the notion of similarity is also funda-
mental to any model of vagueness. Prototype theory [32,33] provides a powerful tool to understand the role of typicality
in concept deﬁnitions, resulting in a natural ordering on possible exemplars of concepts e.g. Bill is taller than Mary, but
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: j.lawry@bris.ac.uk (J. Lawry), tyongchuan@gmail.com (Y. Tang).0004-3702/$ – see front matter © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.artint.2009.07.006
1540 J. Lawry, Y. Tang / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 173 (2009) 1539–1558Mary is richer than Bill. In this paper we attempt to provide a formal framework for representing the epistemic uncertainty
associated with vague concepts, which incorporates elements of prototype theory.
The modelling of concept vagueness in Artiﬁcial Intelligence has been dominated by ideas from fuzzy set theory as
originally proposed by Zadeh [38]. In that approach the extension of a concept is represented by a fuzzy set which has a
graded characteristic or membership function with values ranging between 0 and 1. This allows for intermediate membership
(values in (0,1)) in vague concepts resulting in intermediate truth values for propositions involving vague concepts (fuzzy
logic). The calculus for fuzzy set theory is truth-functional which means that the full complement of Boolean laws cannot all
be satisﬁed [4].1 Furthermore, fuzzy set theory and fuzzy logic do not in their narrowest manifestations adopt an epistemic
view of vagueness. Hájek [14], for example, argues that membership values of fuzzy categories are primitives quantifying
gradedness of membership according to which it is meaningless to refer to unknown or uncertain crisp boundaries of vague
concepts, since such boundaries are inherently fuzzy. On the other hand, many of the proposed interpretations of fuzzy sets
implicitly adopt an epistemic position. In particular, the random set model of fuzzy sets (see [12,13] and [27]) according to
which fuzzy set membership functions correspond to single point coverage functions of a random set, inherently assumes
the existence of an uncertain but crisp set representing the extension of a vague concept. The basis of the label semantics
theory [21] outlined in this paper is also a random set model of vagueness but where the intention is to quantify uncertainty
concerning the applicability or appropriateness of labels to describe a given example. Such a theory cannot result in a truth-
functional calculus but can be functional in a weaker sense in the presence of certain assumptions concerning the semantic
dependence between labels.
A principal motivation for this paper is to explore the relationship between prototype theory and label semantics. Hence,
there will be a focus on mathematical results demonstrating a clear link between these two theories in the case when
categorization (labeling) involves thresholding of a measure of similarity to prototypes. Furthermore, we will argue from
an Artiﬁcial Intelligence perspective, that the proposed framework could be a suitable model for rational intelligent agents
who use concept labels and label expressions to describe elements of their environment with the aim of communicating
information to their fellow agents.
An outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes a variant of the epistemic theory of vagueness which provides
the philosophical underpinnings for the formal models we propose [23]. Section 3 provides an overview of label semantics
as ﬁrst proposed in [21] and [22]. Section 4 discusses the relationship between prototype theory, typicality, uncertainty and
vagueness. Section 5 describes a new prototype theory interpretation of label semantics and ﬁnally Section 6 gives some
conclusions and possible directions for future work.
2. An epistemic theory of vagueness
In our everyday use of language we are continually faced with decisions about the best way to describe objects and
instances in order to convey the information we intend. For example, suppose you are witness to a robbery, how should
you describe the robber so that police on patrol in the streets will have the best chance of spotting him? You will have
certain labels that can be applied, for example tall, short, medium, fat, thin, blonde, etc., some of which you may view as
inappropriate for the robber, others perhaps you think are deﬁnitely appropriate while for some labels you are uncertain
whether they are appropriate or not. On the other hand, perhaps you have some ordered preferences between labels so that
tall is more appropriate than medium which is in turn more appropriate than short. Your choice of words to describe the
robber should surely then be based on these judgments about the appropriateness of labels. Yet where does this knowledge
come from and more fundamentally what does it actually mean to say that a label is or is not appropriate? In the sequel
we shall propose an interpretation of vague description labels based on a particular notion of appropriateness and suggest
a measure of subjective uncertainty resulting from an agent’s partial knowledge about what labels are appropriate to assert.
Furthermore, we will suggest that the vagueness of these description labels lies fundamentally in the uncertainty about if
and when they are appropriate as governed by the rules and conventions of language use.
It seems undeniable that humans posses some kind of mechanism for deciding whether or not to make certain assertions
(e.g. ‘The robber is blonde’) or to agree to a classiﬁcation (e.g. ‘Yes he was tall’). Furthermore, although the underlying
concepts are often vague the decisions about assertions are, at a certain level, bivalent. That is to say for a particular
example x and description θ , you are either willing to assert that ‘x is θ ’ or not. Of course in general this decision may
depend on many factors associated with the context in which the communication is taking place. For example, you are
likely to be much more cautious in your use of language when describing a robber to the police than in describing a
colleague to a close friend. Also, your motives may be much more complex than purely to communicate information. For
example, you may have recognized the robber as a family member so that your aim when describing him is to throw the
police off the scent. Nonetheless, there seems to be an underlying assumption that some things can be correctly asserted
while others cannot. Exactly where the dividing line lies between those labels that are and those that are not appropriate to
use may be uncertain, but the assumption that such a division exists would be a natural precursor to any decision making
process of the kind just described.
1 Except in the case where truth-values are restricted to {0,1} when fuzzy set theory reduces to classical set theory.
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Williamson assumes that for the extensions of a vague concept there is a precise but unknown dividing boundary between
it and the extension of the negation of that concept. For example, consider the set of heights which are classiﬁed as being
tall, then there is according to the epistemic view a precise but unknown height for which all values less than this height
are not tall while all those greater than it are tall. From this viewpoint Sorities problems are resolved by denying the
assumption that practically indistinguishable elements satisfy the same vague predicates. Hence, for a ﬁnite sequence of
increasing heights xi: i = 1, . . . ,k where x1 is not tall, xk is tall and xi+1 − xi   , for some very small positive number  , it
holds that: ∃i for which ‘xi is not tall’ and ‘xi+1 is tall’. Although the exact value of i will be virtually impossible for anyone
to identify precisely.
2.1. The epistemic stance
While there are marked similarities between the epistemic view and that proposed in this paper, there are also some
important differences. For instance, the epistemic view would seem to assume the existence of some objectively correct,
but unknown, set of criteria for determining whether or not a given instance satisﬁes a vague concept. Instead of this we
argue that individuals when faced with decision problems regarding assertions ﬁnd it useful as part of a decision making
strategy to assume that there is a clear dividing line between those labels which are and those which are not appropriate
to describe a given instance. In other words, in deciding what to assert agents behave as if the epistemic view of vagueness
is correct. We refer to this strategic assumption across a population of communicating agents as the epistemic stance [22,23],
a concise statement of which is as follows:
Each individual agent in the population assumes the existence of a set of labeling conventions, valid across the whole population,
governing what linguistic labels and expressions can be appropriately used to describe particular instances.
In practice these rules and conventions underlying the appropriate use of labels would not be imposed by some outside
authority. In fact, they may not exist at all in a formal sense. Rather they are represented as a distributed body of knowl-
edge concerning the assertability of predicates in various cases, shared across a population of agents, and emerging as the
result of interactions and communications between individual agents all adopting the epistemic stance. The idea is that the
learning processes of individual agents, all sharing the fundamental aim of understanding how words can be appropriately
used to communicate information, will eventually converge to some degree on a set of shared conventions. The very process
of convergence then to some extent vindicates the epistemic stance from the perspective of individual agents. Of course,
this is not to suggest complete or even extensive agreement between individuals as to these appropriateness conventions.
However, the overlap between agents should be suﬃcient to ensure the effective transfer of useful information. Indeed,
such effective communication does not require perfect agreement. For example, [30] illustrates how two individuals with
different notions of the colour blue can still effectively use the concept to pass information between them, by considering
how the search space of one person looking for a book required by the other is reduced when they learn that the book is
blue.
In many respects our view is quite close to that of Rohit Parikh [29,30] where he argues for an anti-representational view
of vagueness, focusing on the notion of assertability rather than that of truth. Parikh argues that it is almost unavoidable
that different speakers will use the same predicate in different ways because of the manner in which language is learnt.
Since vague predicates lack a clear deﬁnition we tend to learn the ‘usage of these words in some few cases and then
we extrapolate’. With reference to Dewey and Wittgenstein, Parikh argues for a view of language where truth is relatively
unimportant, but where communication is best thought of in terms of a set of social practices. What is important then is
not whether a particular expression is true but whether it is assertible. To quote Parikh directly:
“Certain sentences are assertible in the sense that we might ourselves assert them and other cases of sentences which
are non-assertible in the sense that we ourselves (and many others) would reproach someone who used them. But there
will also be the intermediate kind of sentences, where we might allow their use.”
Hence, the epistemic stance requires that agents make decisions on what is or is not appropriate to assert, based on their
past experience of language use and on the assumption that there are existing linguistic conventions that should be adhered
to if they do not wish to be misunderstood or contradicted. This decision problem would naturally lead agents to consider
their subjective beliefs concerning the appropriateness of the available description labels in a given context. Uncertainty
about such beliefs could then be quantiﬁed by using subjective probabilities, as proposed originally by de Finetti [3] and
Ramsey [31] for other types of epistemic uncertainty. In the next section we introduce label semantics as a subjective
probability based model of an agent’s uncertainty about the appropriateness of expressions to describe a given instance,
consistent with them adopting the epistemic stance.
To summarize, both the epistemic theory and the theory outlined in this paper identify vagueness as being a type of
ignorance. For the epistemic theory this ignorance concerns the objective (but partially unknown) boundaries of concepts.
While in our approach the focus is on an individual agent’s ignorance of the underlying linguistic conventions governing the
use of concept labels as part of communications between agents. In both cases, the association of vagueness with ignorance
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a matter of degree. Over recent years an extensive literature has emerged focusing on logical aspects of the fuzzy approach
[14,28], including for example, embedding probability theory within a many-valued logic framework [9]. This work, however,
is not within the scope of our paper.
3. The label semantics framework
Label semantics proposes two fundamental and inter-related measures of the appropriateness of labels as descriptions of
an object or value. Given a ﬁnite set of labels LA a set of compound expressions LE can then be generated through recursive
applications of logical connectives. The labels Li ∈ LA are intended to represent words such as adjectives and nouns which
can be used to describe elements from the underlying universe Ω . In other words, Li correspond to description labels for
which the expression ‘x is Li ’ is meaningful for any x ∈ Ω . This is exactly the type of expressions that Zadeh considers in
his work in linguistic variables [40–42]. For example, if Ω is the set of all possible rgb values then LA could consist of the
basic colour labels such as red, yellow, green, orange etc. In this case LE then contains those compound expression such as
red & yellow, not blue nor orange etc. Note that in contrast to Kit Fine [8] in his discussion of penumbral connections we
do not make the a priori assumption that the labels LA are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. This potentially allows for
compound expressions such as red & orange to explicitly refer to boundaries between labels. The measure of appropriateness
of an expression θ ∈ LE as a description of instance x is denoted by μθ(x) and quantiﬁes the agent’s subjective belief that
θ can be used to describe x based on his/her (partial) knowledge of the current labeling conventions of the population.
From an alternative perspective, when faced with an object to describe, an agent may consider each label in LA and attempt
to identify the subset of labels that are appropriate to use. Let this set be denoted by Dx . In the face of their uncertainty
regarding labeling conventions the agent will also be uncertain as to the composition of Dx , and in label semantics this
is quantiﬁed by a probability mass function mx : 2LA → [0,1] on subsets of labels. The relationship between these two
measures will be described below.
Deﬁnition 1 (Label expressions). Given a ﬁnite set of labels LA the corresponding set of label expressions LE is deﬁned
recursively as follows:
• If L ∈ LA then L ∈ LE.
• If θ,ϕ ∈ LE then ¬θ, θ ∧ ϕ, θ ∨ ϕ ∈ LE.
The mass function mx on sets of labels then quantiﬁes the agent’s belief that any particular subset of labels contains all
and only the labels with which it is appropriate to describe x i.e. mx(F ) is the agent’s subjective probability that Dx = F .
Deﬁnition 2 (Mass function on labels). ∀x ∈ Ω a mass function on labels is a function mx : 2LA → [0,1] such that∑
F⊆LA mx(F ) = 1.
The appropriateness measure, μθ(x), and the mass function mx are then related to each other on the basis that asserting
‘x is θ ’ provides direct constraints on Dx . For example, asserting ‘x is L’ for L ∈ LA implies that L is appropriate to describe
x and hence that L ∈ Dx . Furthermore, asserting ‘x is L1 ∧ L2’, for labels L1, L2 ∈ LA is taken as conveying the information
that both L1 and L2 are appropriate to describe x so that {L1, L2} ⊆ Dx . Similarly, ‘x is ¬L’ implies that L is not appropriate
to describe x so L /∈ Dx . In general we can recursively deﬁne a mapping λ : LE → 22LA from expressions to sets of subsets of
labels, such that the assertion ‘x is θ ’ directly implies the constraint Dx ∈ λ(θ) and where λ(θ) is dependent on the logical
structure of θ . For example, if LA= {low, medium, high} then λ(medium∧¬high) = {{low,medium}, {medium}} corresponding
to those sets of labels which include medium but do not include high.
Deﬁnition 3 (λ-mapping). λ : LE → 22LA is deﬁned recursively as follows: ∀θ, ϕ ∈ LE
• ∀Li ∈ LA λ(Li) = {F ⊆ LA: Li ∈ F }.
• λ(θ ∧ ϕ) = λ(θ) ∩ λ(ϕ).
• λ(θ ∨ ϕ) = λ(θ) ∪ λ(ϕ).
• λ(¬θ) = λ(θ)c .
Based on the λ mapping we then deﬁne μθ(x) as the sum of mx over those set of labels in λ(θ).
Deﬁnition 4 (Appropriateness measure). The appropriateness measure deﬁned by mass function mx is a function μ : LA×Ω →
[0,1] satisfying
∀θ ∈ LE, ∀x ∈ Ω μθ(x) =
∑
F∈λ(θ)
mx(F )
where μθ(x) is used as shorthand notation for μ(θ, x).
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quantiﬁes the agent’s belief that none of the labels are appropriate to describe x. We might observe that this phenomena
occurs frequently in natural language, especially when labeling perceptions generated along some continuum. For example,
we occasionally encounter colours for which none of our available colour descriptors seem appropriate. Hence, the value
mx(∅) is an indicator of the describability of x in terms of the labels LA.
Semantic relations | meaning ‘more speciﬁc than’ and ≡ meaning ‘equivalent to’ can be deﬁned on LE in the classical
manner. Let Val be the set of valuation functions v : LA → {0,1} where for Li ∈ LA, v(Li) = 1 means that Li is appropriate
in the current context. In particular, the epistemic stance dictates that for each x ∈ Ω there would be a corresponding
valuation vx (partially unknown to the agent) determining which labels are appropriate to describe x. A valuation v ∈ Val
naturally determines an extension v : LE → {0,1} deﬁned recursively as follows: For θ,ϕ ∈ LE; v(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(v(θ), v(ϕ)),
v(θ ∧ ϕ) =min(v(θ), v(ϕ)), and v(¬θ) = 1− v(θ). We can now deﬁne | and ≡ as follows:
Deﬁnition 5. ∀θ,ϕ ∈ LE
• θ | ϕ if ∀v ∈ Val v(θ) = 1⇒ v(ϕ) = 1.
• θ ≡ ϕ if ∀v ∈ Val v(θ) = v(ϕ).
• θ is a tautology if ∀v ∈ Val v(θ) = 1.
• θ is a contradiction if ∀v ∈ Val v(θ) = 0.
Given Deﬁnitions 4 and 5 it can be shown that appropriateness measures have the following general properties [21,22]:
Theorem 6 (General properties of appropriateness measures). ∀θ,ϕ ∈ LE the following properties hold:
• If θ | ϕ then ∀x ∈ Ω μθ(x)μϕ(x).
• If θ ≡ ϕ then ∀x ∈ Ω μθ(x) = μϕ(x).
• If θ is a tautology then ∀x ∈ Ω μθ(x) = 1.
• If θ is a contradiction then ∀x ∈ Ω μθ(x) = 0.
• If θ ∧ ϕ is a contradiction then ∀x ∈ Ω μθ∨ϕ(x) = μθ(x) + μϕ(x).
• ∀x ∈ Ω μ¬θ (x) = 1− μθ(x).
• For F ⊆ LA let θF = (∧Li∈F Li) ∧ (∧Li /∈F ¬Li) then mx(F ) = μθF (x).
From Theorem 6 it can be seen that for a ﬁxed x ∈ Ω , appropriateness measures correspond to probabilities on LE. More
speciﬁcally, μθ(x) can be interpreted as the subjective conditional probability that θ is an appropriate expression given that
the element x is being described [21,22]. This naturally links label semantics to the conditional probability interpretation
of fuzzy sets proposed by Hisdal [19] and widely developed by Coletti and Scozzafava [2]. However, as we will see in the
following section, the mass function based deﬁnition of appropriateness measures enables us to explore links with random
set theory and to formulate certain consonance assumptions in a straightforward manner. The random set approach is also
well suited to exploring the link between label semantics and prototype theory as shown in Section 5.
3.1. Functionality of appropriateness measures
From Deﬁnition 4 we see that in order to be able to evaluate the appropriateness measure of any expression θ ∈ LE as a
description for x ∈ Ω we must potentially know the value of mx for all subsets of LA. Hence, we are, in principle, required
to specify of order 2|LA| − 1 values for mx . For large basic label sets this is clearly computationally infeasible. One solution
to this problem would be to make additional assumptions about the deﬁnition of the mass assignment mx so that there
exists a functional relationship between the appropriateness measure for the basic labels (i.e. μL(x): L ∈ LA) and mx . This
would result in a functional calculus for appropriateness measures according to which the appropriateness of any compound
expression could be determined directly from the appropriateness of the basic labels in the following sense:
Deﬁnition 7 (Functional measures). A measure μ : LE × Ω → [0,1] is said to be functional if ∀θ ∈ LE there exists a function
fθ : [0,1]|LA| → [0,1] such that ∀x ∈ Ω μθ(x) = fθ (μL(x): L ∈ LA).
Now fuzzy logic is clearly functional in the sense of Deﬁnition 7 but it also satisﬁes the stronger property of truth-
functionality. Truth-functionality deﬁnes the mapping fθ to be a recursive combination of functions representing each
connective, as determined by the logical structure of the expression θ . More formally:
Deﬁnition 8 (Truth-functional measures). A measure μ : LE × Ω → [0,1] is said to truth-functional if there exists mappings
f¬ : [0,1] → [0,1], f∧ : [0,1]2 → [0,1] and f∨ : [0,1]2 → [0,1] and such that ∀θ,ϕ ∈ LE:
• ∀x ∈ Ω μ¬θ (x) = f¬(μθ (x)).
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• ∀x ∈ Ω μθ∨ϕ(x) = f∨(μθ (x),μϕ(x)).
Now from Theorem 6 it follows that appropriateness measures must satisfy the laws of excluded middle and idempo-
tence. Hence, by the following theorem due to Dubois and Prade [4] they cannot be truth-functional except in the trivial
case where all appropriateness values are either 0 or 1.
Theorem 9. (See Dubois and Prade [4].) If μ : LE × Ω → [0,1] is a truth-functional measure and satisﬁes both idempotence and the
law of excluded middle then ∀θ ∈ LE, ∀x ∈ Ω , μθ(x) ∈ {0,1}.
However, Theorem 9 does not apply to all functional measures, only those which are truth-functional, hence it may
still be possible to deﬁne a functional calculus for appropriateness measures consistent with both Deﬁnitions 4 and 7. To
investigate this possibility further we consider the relationship between appropriateness measures of compound expressions
and those of the basic labels, imposed by Deﬁnition 4.
From Deﬁnition 3 the lambda mapping for a basic label Li ∈ LA is given by λ(Li) = {F ⊆ LA: Li ∈ F } and hence the mass
function mx must satisfy the following constraint imposed by the appropriateness measures for the basic labels μLi (x):
Li ∈ LA:
∀x ∈ Ω, ∀Li ∈ LA μLi (x) =
∑
F⊆LA: Li∈F
mx(F )
This constraint, however, is not suﬃcient to identify a unique mass function mx given values for μLi (x): Li ∈ LA. Indeed,
there are in general an inﬁnite set of mass functions satisfying the above equation for a given set of basic label appropri-
ateness values. Hence, in this context, the assumption of a functional calculus for appropriateness measures is equivalent to
the assumption of a selection function which identiﬁes a unique mass function from this set [21,22].
Deﬁnition 10 (Selection function). Let M be the set of all mass functions on 2LA . Then a selection function is a function
η : [0,1]|LA| → M such that if ∀x ∈ Ωη(μLi (x) : Li ∈ LA) =mx then
∀x ∈ Ω ∀Li ∈ LA
∑
F⊆LA: Li∈F
mx(F ) = μLi (x)
Now since the value of μθ(x) for any expression θ ∈ LE can be evaluated directly from mx , then given a selection function
η we have a functional method for determining μθ(x) from the basic label appropriateness values, where fθ in Deﬁnition 7
is given by:
fθ
(
μLi (x): Li ∈ LA
)= ∑
F∈λ(θ)
η
(
μLi (x): Li ∈ LA
)
(F )
Two examples of selection functions are the consonant and the independent selection functions as deﬁned below:
Deﬁnition 11 (Consonant selection function). Given non-zero appropriateness measures on basic labels μLi (x): i = 1, . . . ,n
ordered such that μLi (x)μLi+1 (x) for i = 1, . . . ,n then the consonant selection function identiﬁes the mass function,
mx
({L1, . . . , Ln})= μLn (x)
mx
({L1, . . . , Li})= μLi (x) − μLi+1(x) for i = 1, . . . ,n
mx(∅) = 1−μL1(x)
Deﬁnition 12 (Independent selection function). Given appropriateness measures on basic labels μLi (x): Li ∈ LA then the inde-
pendent selection function identiﬁes the mass function,
∀F ⊆ LA mx(F ) =
∏
Li∈F
μLi (x) ×
∏
Li /∈F
(
1− μLi (x)
)
The consonant selection function corresponds to the assumption that for each x ∈ Ω an agent ﬁrst identiﬁes a total
ordering on the appropriateness of labels. They then evaluate their belief values mx about which labels are appropriate to
describe x in such a way so as to be consistent with this ordering. More formally, let x denote the appropriateness ordering
on LA for element x so that L1 x L2 means that L2 is at least as appropriate as L1 for describing x. When evaluating mx(F )
for F ⊆ LA the agent then makes the assumption that the mass value is non-zero only if for every label Li ∈ F it also holds
that L j ∈ F for every L j ∈ LA for which Li x L j .
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take into account the level of appropriateness of any other label. Although this may seem diﬃcult to justify, it could be
reasonable in cases where labels relate to different facets of the object. For example, the appropriateness of the label thin
might well be assumed to be independent of the appropriateness of the label rich.
The following theorems show that the consonant and independent selection functions result in familiar combination
operators for restricted sets of expressions (see [21,22]).
Theorem 13. (See [21,36].) Let LE∧,∨ ⊆ LE denote those expressions generated recursively from LA using only the connectives∧ and∨.
If ∀x ∈ Ω , mx is determined from μL(x): L ∈ LA according to the consonant selection function then ∀θ,ϕ ∈ LE∧,∨ , ∀x ∈ Ω it holds
that:
μθ∧ϕ(x) =min
(
μθ(x),μϕ(x)
)
and μθ∨ϕ(x) =max
(
μθ(x),μϕ(x)
)
Theorem 14. (See [22].) If ∀x ∈ Ω , mx is determined from μL(x): L ∈ LA according to the independent selection function then for
labels L1, . . . , Ln ∈ LA we have that ∀x ∈ Ω:
μL1∧L2∧···∧Ln (x) =
n∏
i=1
μLi (x)
μL1∨L2∨···∨Ln (x) =
∑
∅=S⊆{L1,...,Ln}
(−1)|S|−1
∏
Li∈S
μLi (x)
One interpretation of selection functions is that they provide a means of encoding the semantic dependence between
labels. From this perspective, the consonant selection function assumes that the appropriateness of all labels are assessed on
the basis of the same set of shared attributes i.e. that they can be represented within a single conceptual space [11]. Typical
examples might be height labels such as tall, medium and short or colour labels. Alternatively, the independent selection
function assumes a set of labels where the appropriateness of each label is judged on the basis of a set of attributes inde-
pendent from those employed to assess the appropriateness of any other label i.e. we have a set of independent conceptual
spaces (one for each label) with no shared or dependent attributes. Intermediate cases between the consonant and inde-
pendent selection functions can also be considered, perhaps resulting in the kind of partial orderings on appropriateness
proposed in [23]. We shall return to the discussion of semantic dependence in the sequel where we will consider the issue
from a prototype theory perspective.
3.2. Assertability decisions
For any given x ∈ Ω and expression θ ∈ LE it remains unclear exactly how an agent would use their evaluation of the
appropriateness measure μθ(x) in order to reach a decision as to whether or not the statement ‘x is θ ’ is assertible. One
possibility would be to use a threshold based approach according to which a positive decision to assert ‘x is θ ’ would
require that the appropriateness measure μθ(x) be suﬃciently close to 1. More formally, an agent would be willing to
assert ‘x is θ ’ at certainty level α  0.5, denoted Assertα(x is θ), if μθ(x) α. For a tautology θ ∨ ¬θ we would then have
Assertα(x is θ ∨ ¬θ) holding at any certainty level α. However, for α max(μθ (x),1− μθ(x)) neither ‘x is θ ’ nor ‘x is ¬θ ’
is assertible at certainty level α i.e. Assertα(x is θ) ∨ Assertα(x is ¬θ) does not hold. This is consistent with the intuition
that, for example, an agent would happily concede that any given colour is either red or not red even though for certain
borderline cases they would be unwilling to use either the description red or the description not red. In general, for x ∈ Ω
and expressions θ,ϕ ∈ LE Assertα(x is θ ∨ ϕ) is not equivalent to Assertα(x is θ) ∨ Assertα(x is ϕ) since the former requires
that μθ∨ϕ(x) α while the latter requires that max(μθ (x),μϕ(x)) α. Indeed, if the consonant selection function is applied
it can be seen from Theorem 13 that these two assertability statements are only equivalent for expressions θ and ϕ which
do not involve negation i.e. θ,ϕ ∈ LE∧,∨ .
Notice that although μθ(x) is an indication of the assertability of the statement ‘x is θ ’ it should not be interpreted as the
probability that this assertion will actually occur during communications aimed at describing x. Instead, μθ(x) quantiﬁes the
belief that the expression θ is appropriate to describe x, where appropriateness is judged purely on the basis of the agent’s
interpretation of the meaning of θ . This understanding of meaning would in turn be based on an internal representation2
of the labels in LA, as inferred from the agent’s past experience of communications involving these labels. This is not the
same as taking μθ(x) as corresponding to the probability of assertion ‘x is θ ’ actually occurring. For example, given a basic
label Li ∈ LA then from a semantic perspective the expressions Li and ¬¬Li are equally appropriate to describe any given
x (with equal appropriateness measures). However, for those x with high appropriateness measures for these equivalent
expressions, the assertion ‘x is Li ’ is perhaps much more likely to be actually used than the assertion ‘x is ¬¬Li ’, for
reasons of syntactic simplicity. Indeed, Lawry [24] proposes a model for evaluating the probability of assertions, based on
2 In the sequel we shall suggest that this internal representation might be based on prototypes.
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appropriateness measures, which takes into account a prior weighting on expressions dependent, for example, on their
relative syntactic complexity. This, however, is beyond the scope of the current paper.
4. Prototype theory and vagueness
The central tenet of Prototype theory (Rosch [32,33]) is that concepts, rather than being deﬁned by formal rules or map-
pings, are represented by prototypes and that categorization is based on similarity to these prototypes (see Hampton [15]
for an overview). By taking typicality to be a decreasing function of distance from prototypes, this approach would naturally
explain the fact that some instances are seen as being more typical exemplars of a concept than others. For example, robins
are more typical exemplars of birds than penguins, since the latter have certain atypical characteristics such as the inability
to ﬂy. This notion of typicality is also strongly related to concept vagueness where borderline cases have an intermediate
range of typicality values. In other words, such cases are not suﬃciently similar to the concept prototypes to be judged as
having certain membership in the category but are also not suﬃciently dissimilar to the prototypes to be ruled as being
certainly outside the category.
Gärdenfors [11] has recently introduced the notion of conceptual spaces for concept representation, corresponding to a
metric space of (possibly) dependent attributes or features of elements from the underlying universe Ω . For example, the
NCS colour spindle [35] is a proposed conceptual space for colour categories based on polar attributes Hue and Chromaticness
and where Chromaticness is constrained by a third attribute, Intensity (see Fig. 1). Within a conceptual space properties are
represented by convex regions. This provides a natural link to prototype theory since given a convex set of prototypes for
each property the space is partitioned into convex regions each deﬁned as the set of points closest to the prototypes for a
given property. Such partitions are referred to as Voronoi tessellations.
Similarity to prototypes has been widely suggested as a possible basis for membership functions in fuzzy logic. Dubois
and Prade [6] and also Dubois et al. [7] identify such an interpretation as one of the three main semantics for membership
degrees. For example, Ruspini [34] introduces a semantics for fuzzy reasoning where, given a measure of similarity between
elements with a range between 0 (totally dissimilar) and 1 (totally similar), the membership degree of an element x in a
concept corresponds to the supremum of the similarity values between x and the prototypes for the concept. Hampton [16]
proposed a thresholding model for categorization whereby an instance is positively classiﬁed as belonging to a category if
its similarity to the prototypes of that category exceeds a certain threshold. In the sequel we demonstrate the relationship
between label semantics and exactly such a thresholding model.
5. A prototype theory interpretation of label semantics
In this interpretation it is proposed that the basic labels in LA correspond to natural categories each with an associated
set of prototypes. A label L is then deemed to be an appropriate description of an element x ∈ Ω provided that x is suﬃ-
ciently similar to the prototypes for L. The requirement of being ‘suﬃciently similar’ is clearly imprecise and is modelled here
by introducing an uncertain threshold on distance from prototypes. In keeping with the epistemic stance this uncertainty is
assumed to be probabilistic in nature. In other words, an agent believes that there is some optimal threshold of this kind ac-
cording to which he or she is best able to abide by the conventions of language when judging the appropriateness of labels.
However, the agent is uncertain as to exactly what this threshold should be and instead deﬁnes a probability distribution on
potential threshold values. Notice that the idea of an uncertain threshold ﬁts well with the epistemic theory of vagueness
since it naturally results in uncertain (but crisp) concept boundaries. Although, as discussed in Section 2, the assumption of
an unknown objective deﬁnition of the concept is not required. Instead within such a model the agent’s knowledge of the
threshold probability distribution and also of the label prototypes would be derived from their experience of language use
across a population of communicating agents each adopting the epistemic stance.
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In this section we begin by introducing a special case of the prototype model that results in a calculus for appropriateness
measures consistent with the consonant selection function (Deﬁnition 11). We then propose a more general theory which
can represent a range of semantic dependencies between labels.
5.1. A consonant model
Suppose that a distance function3 d is deﬁned on Ω such that d : Ω2 → [0,∞) and satisﬁes d(x, x) = 0 and
d(x, y) = d(y, x) for all elements x, y ∈ Ω . This function is then extended to sets of elements such that for S, T ⊆ Ω ,
d(S, T ) = inf{d(x, y): x ∈ S and y ∈ T }. For each label Li ∈ LA let there be a set Pi ⊆ Ω corresponding to prototypical
elements for which Li is certainly an appropriate description. Within this framework Li is deemed to be appropriate to
describe an element x ∈ Ω provided x is suﬃciently close or similar to a prototypical element in Pi . This is formalized by
the requirement that x is within a maximal distance threshold  of Pi . I.e. Li is appropriate to describe x if d(x, Pi)  
where   0. From this perspective an agent’s uncertainty regarding the appropriateness of a label to describe a value x is
characterised by his or her uncertainty regarding the distance threshold  . In fact, it is also possible that an agent could be
uncertain regarding the deﬁnition of the prototype sets Pi . However, for this paper we make the simpliﬁcation assumption
that no uncertainty is associated with the prototypes. Here we assume that  is a random variable and that the uncertainty
is represented by a probability density function δ for  deﬁned on [0,∞).4 Within this interpretation a natural deﬁnition
of the complete description of an element Dx and the associated mass function mx can be given as follows:
Deﬁnition 15. For  ∈ [0,∞) Dx = {Li ∈ LA: d(x, Pi) } and ∀F ⊆ LA mx(F ) = δ({: Dx = F }).5
Intuitively speaking Dx identiﬁes the set of labels with prototypes lying within  of x. Fig. 2 shows Dx in a hypothetical
conceptual space as  varies. Notice that the sequence Dx as  varies generates a nested hierarchy of label sets. Furthermore,
the distance metric d naturally generates a total ordering on the appropriateness of labels for any element x, according to
which label L j is as least as appropriate to describe x as label Li if x is closer (or equidistant) to P j than to Pi i.e. Li x L j
iff d(x, Pi) d(x, P j) as suggested in Section 3.1.
Also notice from Deﬁnition 15, that for Li ∈ LA the appropriateness measure μLi (x) is given by δ({: Li ∈ Dx }). Conse-
quently, if we view Dx as a random set from [0,∞) into 2LA then μLi (x) corresponds to the single point coverage function6
of Dx . This provides us with a link to the random set interpretation of fuzzy sets (see [6,7,12,13,27]) except that in this case
the random set maps to sets of labels rather than sets of elements. Hence, the interpretation of label semantics as proposed
above provides a link between random set theory and prototype theory. A further consequence of this relationship with
random set theory is that ∀x ∈ Ω , the mass function mx must satisfy the conditions given in Deﬁnition 11. This follows
from the well-known fact that the mass function of a nested (or consonant) ﬁnite random set, in this case Dx , can be
determined uniquely from its single point coverage function (see [22] for an exposition).
The following results show how the appropriateness of an expression θ ∈ LE to describe an element x is equivalent to a
constraint  ∈ I(θ, x), for a measurable subset I(θ, x) of [0,∞) deﬁned as follows:
3 d may also be a distance metric if it satisﬁes the triangular inequality ∀x, y, z ∈ Ω d(x, z) d(x, y) + d(y, z), but this is not strictly required.
4 Even though  is a random variable there is no suggestion of any underlying stochastic process. Instead an agent’s uncertainty concerning  is epistemic
in nature and dependent on their experience of language use as discussed in Section 2.1.
5 For Lebesgue measurable set I , we denote δ(I) = ∫I δ()d i.e. we also use δ to denote the probability measure induced by density function δ.
6 For a ﬁnite random set S into 2U , where U is the underlying ﬁnite universe, the associate mass function m : 2U → [0,1] is such that for T ⊆ U , m(T )
is the probability that S = T . The single point coverage function then corresponds to the probability that z ∈ S , for z ∈ U , and is given by ∑T : z∈T m(T ).
In label semantics U = LA and S = Dx .
1548 J. Lawry, Y. Tang / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 173 (2009) 1539–1558Deﬁnition 16. ∀x ∈ Ω and θ ∈ LE, I(θ, x) ⊆ [0,∞) is deﬁned recursively as follows: ∀θ,ϕ ∈ LE
• ∀Li ∈ LA I(Li, x) = [d(x, Pi),∞).
• I(θ ∧ ϕ, x) = I(θ, x) ∩ I(ϕ, x).
• I(θ ∨ ϕ, x) = I(θ, x) ∪ I(ϕ, x).
• I(¬θ, x) = I(θ, x)c .
Theorem 17.
∀θ ∈ LE, ∀x ∈ Ω I(θ, x) = {: Dx ∈ λ(θ)}
Proof. Let
LE(1) = LA and LE(k) = LE(k−1) ∪ {θ ∧ ϕ, θ ∨ ϕ,¬θ : θ,ϕ ∈ LE(k−1)}
We now prove the result by induction on k.
Limit Case: k= 1 For Li ∈ LA we have that
I(Li, x) =
[
d(x, Pi),∞
)= {: d(x, Pi) }= {: Li ∈ Dx }= {: Dx ∈ λ(Li)}
Inductive Step: Assume true for k For Φ ∈ LE(k+1) either Φ ∈ LE(k) , in which case the result holds trivially by the inductive
hypothesis, or one of the following holds:
• Φ = θ ∧ϕ so that I(Φ, x) = I(θ ∧ϕ, x) = I(θ, x)∩ I(ϕ, x) = {: Dx ∈ λ(θ)}∩ {: Dx ∈ λ(ϕ)} (by the inductive hypothesis)= {: Dx ∈ λ(θ) ∩ λ(ϕ)} = {: Dx ∈ λ(θ ∧ ϕ)} = {: Dx ∈ λ(Φ)}.• Φ = θ ∨ϕ so that I(Φ, x) = I(θ ∨ϕ, x) = I(θ, x)∪ I(ϕ, x) = {: Dx ∈ λ(θ)}∪ {: Dx ∈ λ(ϕ)} (by the inductive hypothesis)= {: Dx ∈ λ(θ) ∪ λ(ϕ)} = {: Dx ∈ λ(θ ∨ ϕ)} = {: Dx ∈ λ(Φ)}.• Φ = ¬θ so that I(Φ, x) = I(¬θ, x) = I(θ, x)c = {: Dx ∈ λ(θ)}c = {: Dx ∈ λ(θ)c} = {: Dx ∈ λ(¬θ)} = {: Dx ∈
λ(Φ)}. 
Corollary 18.
∀θ ∈ LE, ∀x ∈ Ω μθ(x) = δ
(
I(θ, x)
)
Proof. The result follows trivially from Theorem 17 and Deﬁnition 15. 
Furthermore, in the case that we restrict ourselves to expressions in LE∧,∨ (Theorem 13) the following result shows that
I(θ, x) simply identiﬁes a lower bound on  .
Deﬁnition 19. We deﬁne lb : LE∧,∨ × Ω → [0,∞) recursively as follows: ∀x ∈ Ω , ∀θ,ϕ ∈ LE∧,∨
• ∀Li ∈ LA lb(Li, x) = d(x, Pi).
• lb(θ ∧ ϕ, x) =max(lb(θ, x), lb(ϕ, x)) and lb(θ ∨ ϕ, x) =min(lb(θ, x), lb(ϕ, x)).
Theorem 20. ∀x ∈ Ω , ∀x ∈ LE∧,∨ , then I(θ, x) = [lb(θ, x),∞).
Proof. Let
LE∧,∨1 = LA and LE∧,∨k = LE∧,∨k−1 ∪
{
θ ∧ ϕ, θ ∨ ϕ: θ,ϕ ∈ LE∧,∨k−1
}
We now prove the result by induction on k.
Limit Case: k= 1 For Li ∈ LA I(Li, x) = [d(x, Pi),∞) = [lb(Li, x),∞) as required.
Inductive Step: Assume true for k For Φ ∈ LE∧,∨k+1 either Φ ∈ LE∧,∨k in which case the result follows trivially from the
inductive hypothesis or one of the following holds:
• Φ = θ ∧ ϕ where θ,ϕ ∈ LE∧,∨k . In this case I(Φ, x) = I(θ, x) ∩ I(ϕ, x) = [lb(θ, x),∞) ∩ [lb(ϕ, x),∞) (by the inductive
hypothesis)= [max(lb(θ, x), lb(ϕ, x)),∞) = [lb(θ ∧ ϕ, x),∞) as required.
• Φ = θ ∨ ϕ where θ,ϕ ∈ LE∧,∨k . In this case I(Φ, x) = I(θ, x) ∪ I(ϕ, x) = [lb(θ, x),∞) ∪ [lb(ϕ, x),∞) (by the inductive
hypothesis)= [min(lb(θ, x), lb(ϕ, x)),∞) = [lb(θ ∨ ϕ, x),∞) as required. 
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Fig. 4. Let LA= {L1, L2, L3, L4} and L4 x L3 x L2 x L1. This ﬁgure shows the values of mx as areas under δ.
Notice, from Theorem 20 we have that ∀θ,ϕ ∈ LE∧,∨ μθ∨ϕ(x) = δ([lb(θ ∨ ϕ, x),∞)) = δ([min(lb(θ, x), lb(ϕ, x)),∞)) =
max(δ([lb(θ, x),∞)), δ([lb(ϕ, x),∞))) = max(μθ (x),μϕ(x)). Similarly, μθ∧ϕ(x) = min(μθ (x),μϕ(x)) as is consistent with
Theorem 13.
Example 21.
I(Li, x) =
[
d(x, Pi),∞
)
, I(¬Li, x) =
[
0,d(x, Pi)
)
, I(Li ∧ L j, x) =
[
max
(
d(x, Pi),d(x, P j)
)
,∞)
I(Li ∨ L j, x) =
[
min
(
d(x, Pi),d(x, P j)
)
,∞)
I(Li ∧ ¬L j, x) =
{ [d(x, Pi),d(x, P j)) if d(x, Pi) < d(x, P j)
∅ otherwise
From Theorem 6 we have that for F ⊆ LA mx(F ) = μθF (x) where θF = (
∧
L∈F L) ∧ (
∧
L /∈F ¬L). Hence, mx(F ) = δ(I(θF , x))
where I(θF , x) = [max{d(x, Pi): Li ∈ F },min{d(x, Pi): Li /∈ F }) provided that max{d(x, Pi): Li ∈ F } < min{d(x, Pi): Li /∈ F }
and = ∅ otherwise.
Figs. 3 and 4 show the areas under δ corresponding to μLi∧¬L j (x) and the values of the mass function mx respectively.
Example 22. Let Ω = [0,10] and the labels LA= {L1, L2, L3} be deﬁned such that P1 = {4}, P2 = [5,7] and P3 = [7.5,8] and
let d(x, y) = ‖x− y‖. Also let δ be a Gaussian density with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.6 renormalised so that area
under [0,10] is 1 (see Fig. 5). Now consider the element x= 4.5 then D is deﬁned as follows:4.5
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Fig. 6. Appropriateness measures for L1, L2 and L3 derived from a Gaussian density δ and prototypes P1 = {4}, P2 = [5,7] and P3 = [7.5,8].
D4.5 =
⎧⎨
⎩
∅  < 0.5
{L1, L2} 0.5  < 3
{L1, L2, L3}   3
The associated mass function m4.5 is then given by
m4.5 = ∅: δ
([0,0.5))≈ 0.5953, {L1, L2}: δ([0.5,3))≈ 0.4047, {L1, L2, L3}: δ([3,10])≈ 0
Fig. 6 shows the appropriateness measures for labels L1, L2 and L3 corresponding to
μLi (x) = δ
([
d(x, Pi),∞
))= δ([d(x, Pi),10])
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5.2. Neighbourhoods of prototypes
Another perspective on the prototype theory view of label semantics results from considering the set of elements from
Ω which can be appropriately described by a label or expression. For an expression θ ∈ LE this subset of Ω would, in
effect, correspond to the extension of the concept represented by θ . Now for the model proposed in Section 5.1 the set
of elements which can be appropriately described by a label Li ∈ LA corresponds to the neighbourhood of Pi (see Fig. 7)
deﬁned by:
N Li =
{
x ∈ Ω: d(x, Pi) 
}
This can be naturally extended to any label expression θ ∈ LE as follows:
Deﬁnition 23.
∀θ ∈ LE N θ =
{
x ∈ Ω: Dx ∈ λ(θ)
}= {x ∈ Ω:  ∈ I(θ, x)}
The following theorem shows that N θ can be determined recursively from neighbourhoods N Li for the basic labels
Li ∈ LA.
Theorem 24. ∀x ∈ Ω, ∀θ,ϕ ∈ LE, ∀ ∈ [0,∞) the following hold:
(i) N θ∧ϕ = N θ ∩ N ϕ .
(ii) N θ∨ϕ = N θ ∪ N ϕ .
(iii) N ¬θ = (N θ )c .
Proof.
(i) N θ∧ϕ = {x: Dx ∈ λ(θ ∧ϕ)} = (by Deﬁnition 3) {x: Dx ∈ λ(θ)∩ λ(ϕ)} = {x: Dx ∈ λ(θ)} ∩ {x: Dx ∈ λ(ϕ)} = N θ ∩ N ϕ (by
Deﬁnition 23).
(ii) N θ∨ϕ = {x: Dx ∈ λ(θ ∨ϕ)} = (by Deﬁnition 3) {x: Dx ∈ λ(θ)∪ λ(ϕ)} = {x: Dx ∈ λ(θ)} ∪ {x: Dx ∈ λ(ϕ)} = N θ ∪ N ϕ (by
Deﬁnition 23).
(iii) N ¬θ = {x: Dx ∈ λ(¬θ)} = (by Deﬁnition 3) {x: Dx ∈ λ(θ)c} = {x: Dx ∈ λ(θ)}c = (N θ )c (by Deﬁnition 23). 
Theorem 25.
∀θ ∈ LE, ∀x ∈ Ω μθ(x) = δ
({
: x ∈ N θ
})
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Li∧¬L j , and y /∈ NLi∧¬L j but y ∈ N
′
Li∧¬L j . Hence N

Li∧¬L j  N
′
Li∧¬L j
and N
′
Li∧¬L j  N

Li∧¬L j .
Proof.
δ
({
: x ∈ N θ
})= (by Deﬁnition 23) δ({: Dx ∈ λ(θ)})= ∑
F : F∈λ(θ)
δ
({
: Dx = F
})
= (by Deﬁnition 15)
∑
F : F∈λ(θ)
mx(F ) = μθ(x) 
Theorem 25 provides us with an alternative characterisation of appropriateness measure μθ(x) as the single point cov-
erage function of the random set neighbourhood N θ . Again this shows a link with the work of Goodman and Nguyen (see
[12,13] and [27]) and their proposed interpretation of fuzzy sets as single point coverage functions of random sets.
The following theorem shows that for expressions θ not involving negation the random set neighbourhood N θ is nested.
Theorem 26. ∀θ ∈ LE∧,∨ and ∀′    0 N θ ⊆ N 
′
θ .
Proof.
N θ =
{
x: Dx ∈ λ(θ)
}= (by Theorem 17) {x:  ∈ I(θ, x)}
= (by Theorem 20) {x: lb(θ, x) }⊆ {x: lb(θ, x) ′}
= {x: ′ ∈ I(θ, x)}= N ′θ (by Deﬁnition 23) 
For expressions θ /∈ LE∧,∨ it is not in general the case that N θ forms a nested sequence as  varies. For example,
consider the expression Li ∧ ¬L j and suppose there are elements x, y ∈ Ω together with real values  ′ >  > 0 such that
d(x, Pi)  < min(d(x, P j),d(y, Pi)) and max(d(y, Pi),d(x, P j)) ′ < d(y, P j) (see for example Fig. 8). In this case x ∈ N Li
and x /∈ N L j , so that x ∈ N Li∧¬L j , while y /∈ N Li so that y /∈ N Li∧¬L j . On the other hand x ∈ N 
′
L j
so that x /∈ N ′Li∧L j , while
y ∈ N ′Li and y /∈ N 
′
L j
so that y ∈ N ′Li∧L j . Hence, N Li∧¬L j  N 
′
Li∧¬L j since y ∈ N 
′
Li∧¬L j and y /∈ N Li∧¬L j . Also, N 
′
Li∧¬L j 
N Li∧¬L j since x ∈ N Li∧¬L j and x /∈ N 
′
Li∧¬L j .
In fuzzy set theory the idea of α-cuts is frequently applied in order to extend classical methods to the fuzzy case [5].
The α-cut of a fuzzy set A, denoted Aα , is given by the set of domain elements with membership in A greater than or
equal to α. In label semantics there is a analogous idea where the α-cut of an expression θ ∈ LE is given by the set of
elements of Ω for which the appropriateness measure of θ is greater than or equal to α i.e. θα = {x ∈ Ω: μθ(x) α}.7 In
the following we show that, provided δ satisﬁes certain smoothness conditions, then there is a direct mapping between the
α-cuts θα and the neighbourhoods N θ for expressions θ ∈ LE∧,∨ .
Deﬁnition 27. Let  : [0,∞) → [0,1] such that () = δ([,∞)).
Notice that since  is an integral (i.e. () = ∫∞ δ()d) it is a continuous decreasing function into [0,1] and that for
labels Li ∈ LAμLi (x) = (d(x, Pi)). This suggests a strong relationship with the threshold model proposed by Hampton [16]
7 Given the assertability model proposed in Section 3.2, then for α 0.5 θα = {x ∈ Ω: Assertα(x is θ)} which corresponds to those elements x for which
‘x is θ ’ can be asserted at certainty level α.
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prototypes) and its membership in that category. Speciﬁcally, Hampton proposed that the membership of an instance in a
category L should be deﬁned as a function m of the similarity of the instance to the prototypes of L, and where m is an
increasing function into [0,1]. Clearly if we replace similarity with distance from prototypes this would naturally suggest
that membership should be a decreasing function m′ of distance into [0,1], as is consistent with label semantics proto-
type model where m′ = . Interestingly, re-analysing an experiment of McCloskey and Glucksberg [25], Hampton [16,17]
required subjects to make binary categorization decisions for 482 items into 17 categories. They also independently made
assessments of typicality. Category membership was then taken as corresponding to the probability of a positive catego-
rization. In general, the results were consistent with a threshold model where m was a cumulative normal distribution.8
Notice, also that if δ is assumed to be a normalised normal distribution (as in Example 22) then  is one minus the corre-
sponding normalised cumulative normal distribution. Hence, the experimental results of McCloskey and Glucksberg appear
to be consistent with individuals making the binary decision that ‘x is Li ’, for category label Li , provided that d(x, Pi) 
for normally distributed threshold  .
Lemma 28. ∀θ ∈ LE∧,∨, ∀α ∈ (0,1] (θ)α = N∗θ where ∗ = sup{: () α}.
Proof. Now clearly  is differentiable and hence continuous. Therefore, {: () α} = [0, ∗] where ∗ = sup{: ()
α}. Hence by Theorems 17 and 20,
(θ)α =
{
x: μθ(x) α
}= {x: δ(I(θ, x)) α}= {x: (lb(θ, x)) α}
= {x: lb(θ, x) ∗}= {x: ∗ ∈ I(θ, x)}= {x: D∗x ∈ λ(θ)}= N∗θ 
Theorem 29. If δ is such that | J : J → (0,1] is a strictly decreasing function where | J is the restriction of  to J = {: () > 0}
then ∀θ ∈ LE∧,∨ , 〈θα,, (0,1]〉 is isomorphic to 〈N θ ,, J 〉.
Proof. Since | J is strictly decreasing and continuous on J then | J : J → (0,1] is a bijection. Consequently, the inverse
function |−1J : (0,1] → J is a strictly decreasing bijective function. Hence, for ∗ = sup{: | J ()  α} we have that
∗ = |−1J (α). Consequently, by Lemma 28 we have that θα = N
|−1J (α)
θ as required. 
Corollary 30. For | J satisfying the conditions of Theorem 29. If α is a random variable into (0,1] deﬁned such that α = | J () then
α is a uniformly distributed random variable.
Proof.
∀α∗ ∈ (0,1] P(α  α∗)= P( |−1J (α∗))= | J (|−1J (α∗))= α∗ 
In [5] the use of α-cuts is proposed as a method for extending set functions to fuzzy sets. Given a set function f : 2Ω →
R and a fuzzy set A on Ω the value f (A) is deﬁned by:
f (A) =
1∫
0
f (Aα)dα
This is the expected value of f (Aα) assuming a uniform distribution α. However, no clear justiﬁcation is given in [5] as to
why α should be uniformly distributed. Now the concept of prototype neighbourhoods suggests a method for extending set
functions to expressions in LE by taking the expected value f (N θ ) as follows:
f (θ) =
∞∫
0
f
(N θ )δ()d
From Corollary 30 we that, for the restricted class of expressions LE∧,∨ , this is equivalent to:
f (θ) =
1∫
0
f (θα)dα
8 In the case of biological categories, there was also evidence that categorization probability was also affected by non-similarity based knowledge e.g.
where an animal looked superﬁcially like one category but was actually in another.
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when averaging over α-cuts of expressions in LE∧,∨ .
5.3. Domain information from vague expressions
One of the principle uses of vague concepts in language is to convey information about the underlying universe Ω in
speciﬁc cases or contexts. Parikh [30] gives the example of two college lecturers Ann and Bob, where Ann asks Bob to
bring in her blue book from her library at home. How can Bob use the information that the ‘book is blue’ to restrict the
possible books of interest? The prototype interpretation of label semantics naturally suggests an imprecise restriction on the
domain Ω imposed by a constraint ‘x is θ ’ where θ ∈ LE. Speciﬁcally, given the information ‘x is θ ’ then, provided θ is not
a contradiction, an agent infers that x ∈ N θ and consequently that N θ = ∅. From the latter inference the agent naturally
generates a posterior distribution δθ on  conditional on the information that the neighbourhood of θ is non-empty, where:
∀ ∈ [0,∞) δθ =
{
δ()
1−δ{: N θ =∅} N

θ = ∅
0 otherwise
Hence, conditioning on the information ‘x is θ ’ results in the following random set model:
Deﬁnition 31. For θ ∈ LE Nθ  is a random set from the probability space 〈B, [0,∞), δθ 〉 into9 the probability space
〈Aθ ,Uθ ,Mθ 〉 where B is the σ -algebra of Borel subsets of [0,∞), δθ is deﬁned as above, Uθ = {N θ :  ∈ [0,∞)},Aθ = {{N θ :  ∈ I}: I ∈ B} and ∀A ∈ Aθ Mθ (A) = δθ ({: N θ ∈ A}).
The single point coverage function of the random set in Deﬁnition 31 then indicates the probability that a value x ∈ Ω
is a possible referent in the assertion ‘x is θ ’:
∀x ∈ Ω spcθ (x) = Mθ
({N θ : x ∈ N θ })= δθ ({: x ∈ N θ })∝ μθ(x)
Notice, from Theorem 26, that in the case of θ ∈ LE∧,∨ then N θ is nested and therefore spcθ (x) is a possibility distribution
on Ω . Hence, for this restricted set of expressions our approach is in accordance with that of Zadeh [39] who argues that
fuzzy information generates possibilistic constraints on the underlying domain of discourse.
5.4. A general model
Suppose for each label Li ∈ LA there is a distinct function di : Ω2 → [0,∞) and a neighbourhood threshold given by
random variable i . Also suppose  = (1, . . . , n) has a joint density function δ deﬁned on [0,∞)n . In this model we have
a natural deﬁnition of the complete description of an element and the neighbourhood of an expression as follows:
Deﬁnition 32.
∀x ∈ Ω Dx =
{
Li: di(x, Pi) i
}
and mx(F ) = δ
({: Dx = F})
∀θ ∈ LE N θ =
{
x ∈ Ω: Dx ∈ λ(θ)
}
Notice from Deﬁnition 32 that if δi denotes the marginal density of i derived from joint density δ then the appropri-
ateness measure for label Li ∈ LA can be evaluated directly from δi according to:
μLi (x) = δ
({
(1, . . . , n): Li ∈ D(1,...,n)x
})= δ({(1, . . . , n): di(x, Li) i,  j ∈ [0,∞) for j = i})
= δi
([
di(x, pi),∞
))
The joint density δ encodes dependencies between the random variables i which in turn reﬂect semantic dependencies
between the labels. For the consonant model we have total dependence where di = d and i =  for all Li ∈ LA. This suggests
that the labels in LA all describe the same characteristic of the elements in Ω as represented by attribute values in a single
conceptual space. Typical examples where such a dependent model may be appropriate are colour labels based on attributes
from a multi-dimensional space such as the so-called colour spindle [11] or on rgb values. Other examples include labels
for one-dimensional characteristics such height, weight, income and, of course, number of hairs on your head. The following
variant on the approach proposed in Section 5.1 also results in a consonant model but where there is variation in scale
between the threshold variables i .
9 I.e. for a ﬁxed θ , N θ is a function from [0,∞) into Uθ which satisﬁes ∀I ∈ B, {N θ :  ∈ I} ∈ Aθ .
J. Lawry, Y. Tang / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 173 (2009) 1539–1558 15555.4.1. A general consonant model
Assume that di = d for all Li ∈ LA and that i = f i() for some increasing function f i : [0,∞) → [0,∞) of random
variable  into [0,∞). Further suppose that  has density function δ deﬁned on [0,∞). Then we deﬁne:
Dx =
{
Li: d(x, Pi) f i()
}
so that mx(F ) = δ
({
: Dx = F
})
and N θ =
{
x ∈ Ω: Dx ∈ λ(θ)
}
Now clearly since f i is an increasing function for Li ∈ LA it holds that Dx ⊆ D′x for   ′ . So Dx forms a nested hierarchy
as  varies.
The following theorem shows how one label Li can be deﬁned as a restriction of another label L j in the consonant
model so that ∀  0 N Li ⊆ N L j . For example, the label navy blue is a restriction of the label blue in this sense. In such
cases L j is an appropriate description whenever Li is appropriate and ∀x ∈ Ω μ¬Li∨L j (x) = 1.
Theorem 33. For labels Li, L j ∈ LA where ∀  0 f j() sup{d(x, P j): x ∈ N Li } then ∀  0 N Li ⊆ N L j .
Proof. For   0 suppose x ∈ N Li then d(x, P j) f j() ⇒ x ∈ N L j . 
Notice that one simple case of nested labels is where Pi ⊆ P j and f i  f j . In this case sup{d(x, P j): d(x, Pi) f i()}
sup{d(x, Pi): d(x, Pi) f i()} (since ∀x d(x, P j) d(x, P j)) f i() f j().
5.4.2. An independence model
Suppose for each label Li ∈ LA there is a distinct metric di : Ω2 → [0,∞). Further suppose that the threshold distance
values for each metric are independent random variables i with density δi , so that the joint density δ =∏Li∈LA δi .
Theorem 34. If i: Li ∈ LA are independent random variables then:
∀F ⊆ LA mx(F ) =
∏
Li∈F
μLi (x) ×
∏
Li /∈F
(
1− μLi (x)
)
Proof. W.l.o.g. assume F = {L1, . . . , Lk} then
mx(F ) = δ
({
(1, . . . , n): D(1,...,n)x = {L1, . . . , Lk}
})
= δ({(1, . . . , n): d1(x, P1) 1, . . . ,dk(x, Pk) k,di(x, Pi) > i, for i > k})
=
∏
ik
δi
([
d(x, Pi),∞
))×∏
i>k
δi
([
0,d(x, Pi)
))=∏
ik
μLi (x) ×
∏
i>k
(
1−μLi (x)
) 
Clearly we see from Theorem 34 that the assumption of independence between i: Li ∈ LA results in a model consistent
with the independent selection function (Deﬁnition 12). This type of model would seem to be relevant in the case where
different labels refer to different independent characteristics of the elements in Ω . For example, if Ω corresponds to a set of
people, then judgments concerning the appropriateness of labels rich and tall would be made on the basis of independent
metrics comparing people in terms of their wealth and their height respectively.
5.4.3. Semantic dependence
Semantic dependence between labels as modelled by the joint distribution δ on i: Li ∈ LA captures the relationship
between the various characteristics described by the different labels in LA. If all labels describe the same characteristic of
elements in Ω , as represented by vectors of attribute values in a shared conceptual space, then an assumption of strong
semantic dependence such as in the consonant model or the general consonant model (Section 5.4.1) is appropriate. On
the other hand, if each label refers to a different characteristic as represented by points in distinct independent conceptual
spaces then an assumption of independence between i , as in Section 5.4.2, is valid. For more diverse label sets LA, we
would expect there to be more complex dependencies between i: Li ∈ LA than the two extreme cases described above.
For example, the characteristics described by different labels may have conceptual spaces which, while not being identical,
have attributes in common or which have dependencies between attributes. It is certainly not the case that every joint
distribution δ will result in a selection function as given in Deﬁnition 10, and hence the resulting calculus for appropriate-
ness measures may not be functional. In such cases it would be interesting to investigate the use of graphical models such
as Bayesian Networks to represent the dependencies between the different threshold variables. However, this possibility is
beyond the scope this paper and remains to be explored as part of future work.
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Typically in prototype theory the prototypes are not necessarily seen as corresponding to actual examples experienced
by the agent but instead as abstractions derived from experience (see Hampton [15]). This is in keeping with many unsu-
pervised learning algorithms where class labels based on clusters are represented by centroids aggregated from actual data.
Alternatively, exemplar models (Medin and Shaffer [26]) are a variant on prototype theory where agents have a memory
store consisting of actually encountered exemplars of particular description labels. The k-nearest neighbours algorithm is
an obvious example of a classiﬁcation method based on this philosophy. Now the application of prototype theory in this
paper does not depend on any distinction between actual exemplars and abstractions provided both are members of the
underlying space Ω . Consequently, the label semantics approach can be applied to both variants of prototype theory.
The model presented in Section 5 deﬁnes prototypes only for the basic labels LA and not for general compound expres-
sions in LE− LA. For expression θ ∈ LE − LA the neighbourhood N θ is deﬁned recursively on the basis of distance from
prototypes for the labels which occur in θ rather than being based on distance from a set of prototypes for θ itself. This is
consistent with the underlying philosophy of label semantics which assumes that the labels LA represent primitive concepts
and that the appropriateness of compound expressions is derived as a function only of the appropriateness of these labels.
Indeed there is a close analogy here with the distinction that Gärdenfors [11] draws between properties which correspond
to convex regions of conceptual space, and hence can potentially be represented by prototypes, and concepts which are con-
structed as combinations of properties. However, in its original conception [32] prototype theory assumes that compound
expressions such as not tall or orange & not red are also deﬁned directly in terms of proximity to a (set of) prototypical
element(s). In the label semantics framework this would correspond to the assumption that for every expression θ ∈ LE
there exists prototypes Pθ ⊆ Ω such that the set of elements which can be appropriately described by θ are exactly those
elements which lie with a threshold  of Pθ i.e. N θ = {x: d(x, Pθ ) }. We shall refer to this assumption as the compound
prototypes hypothesis.
Upon reﬂection the compound prototypes hypothesis reveals itself to be problematic in a number of ways: For example,
consider negated expressions where θ ≡ ¬ϕ for some ϕ ∈ LE. In this case, the epistemic stance would require that N ¬ϕ
should not overlap with N ϕ (i.e. ∀  0 N ϕ ∩ N ¬ϕ = ∅), since an agent would never be willing to assert both ‘x is ϕ ’
and ‘x is ¬ϕ ’ at any threshold level. This requirement, however, is inconsistent with the compound prototypes hypothesis.
To see this consider y ∈ P¬ϕ and let   d(y, Pϕ), then y ∈ N ϕ and y ∈ N ¬ϕ and hence N ϕ ∩ N ¬ϕ ⊇ {y} = ∅. In other
words, if ¬ϕ is deﬁned in terms of the distance from a set of prototypes P¬ϕ then it will always be possible to select
a threshold  suﬃciently large that P¬ϕ and N ϕ overlap. Another diﬃculty with the compound prototypes hypothesis
arises when considering conjunctions where θ ≡ ϕ ∧ ψ . If we take the view that an agent would only be willing to assert
‘x is ϕ ∧ ψ ’ if they are willing to independently assert both ‘x is ϕ ’ and ‘x is ψ ’ then we should assume that ∀  0
N ϕ∧ψ ⊆ N ϕ ∩ N ψ . However, suppose we consider a simple scenario where Ω = R, d(x, y) = ‖x− y‖ (Euclidean distance),
Pϕ = {a} and Pψ = {b} where b > a. We might think of ϕ and ψ as representing imprecise numbers about a and about b
respectively. In this context it would be rather natural to assume that Pϕ∧ψ = {c} where a < c < b. However, selecting
0 <  < d(a,c)2 we have that N ϕ ∩ N ψ = ∅ while N ϕ∧ψ ⊇ {c} = ∅, so that N ϕ∧ψ  N ϕ ∩ N ψ . It should be noted that the
requirement ∀  0 N ϕ∧ψ ⊆ N ϕ ∩ N ψ is only valid since ϕ ∧ ψ is a true conjunctive. In natural language it is often the
case that compound expressions which would appear to be conjunctions from a syntactic perspective, do not semantically
correspond to classical conjunctions. For example, an expressions such as small elephant, while appearing to be in the form
of a conjunction, clearly does not refer to elements of a domain which can be both independently referred to as being
small and as being an elephant. Here the label small is in some sense secondary to the label elephant, whereby the latter
identiﬁes the context in which the former is deﬁned. In a recent paper Freund [10] refers to this ordering of properties in
the deﬁnition of a concept as determination. This notion would also seem to be relevant to the type of expressions studied
in Hampton [18], where experimental results suggest that descriptions such as oﬃce furniture are not treated as classical
conjunctions. A detailed treatment of such expressions is, however, beyond the scope of this paper and the question of how
to extend label semantics so as to include them remains to be explored in future work.
Adopting the compound prototypes hypothesis also requires us to consider how an agent could determine the prototypes
Pθ for every expression θ ∈ LE. In the label semantics model the implicit assumption is that for the basic labels Li ∈ LA, Pi
would be determined by a learning process involving interaction and communication with other agents. Using compound
prototypes could potentially provide an agent with more ﬂexible and relevant concept deﬁnitions if they could base their
choice of prototypes on actual experience of language use. The diﬃculty here, however, is the potentially huge amounts of
data required to determine Pθ for every semantically distinct expression θ ∈ LE. For instance, if |LA| = n then there 22n se-
mantically distinct expressions in LE. For an agent to obtain speciﬁc data on the use of each of these would seem to be
infeasible even for moderately large n. Consequently, it would seem likely that to some extent agents would need to deﬁne
Pθ for compound expression θ based on the prototypes of its component expressions. In effect this would require some vari-
ant of the functionality assumption that for each θ ∈ LE there is a prototype generating function gθ : 2Ω × · · · × 2Ω → 2Ω
according to which Pθ = gθ (Pi: Li ∈ LA). A special case of functionality would then be full prototype compositionality
whereby generating functions g∧ : 2Ω × 2Ω → 2Ω , g∨ : 2Ω × 2Ω → 2Ω and g¬ : 2Ω → 2Ω would be deﬁned, according to
which Pθ∧ϕ = g∧(Pθ , Pϕ), Pθ∨ϕ = g∨(Pθ , Pϕ) and P¬θ = g¬(Pθ ). Now aside from the diﬃculty of deﬁning these generating
functions in an intuitive manner, as discussed at length in Lawry [22], it is diﬃcult to see what advantages as a representa-
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6. Conclusions
We have argued that concept vagueness in natural language is a manifestation of uncertainty about the appropriate
use of labels, which naturally arises as a result of the distributed and example based manner in which language is learnt.
For this reason we adopt an epistemic viewpoint according to which the uncertainty associated with vague concepts is
quantiﬁed by a measure of belief that the relevant labels or expressions are appropriate to describe a given example, and
where appropriateness is governed by the emergent conventions of language use. The label semantics framework has then
been introduced to provide a formal calculus for appropriateness measures of this kind.
Prototype theory is an effective tool by which we can understand the role of similarity and typicality in the deﬁnition
of natural categories. The use of uncertain thresholds on the distance between elements and prototypes in order to de-
ﬁne boundaries for labels provides a clear link between prototype theory and the epistemic view of vagueness, as well as
providing an intuitive interpretation of appropriateness measures. This prototype model can be understood from two per-
spectives characterised by the random sets Dx and N θ respectively. For an element x ∈ Ω , Dx identiﬁes those labels in
LA with prototypes suﬃciently close (i.e. within ) to x for them to be deemed appropriate descriptions of x. On the other
hand, for a given expression θ the neighbourhood N θ contains those elements for which θ is an appropriate description.
Both approaches provide characterisations of appropriateness measures as single point coverage functions of random sets.
Intuitively, an agent would focus on Dx when attempting to identify appropriate descriptions of a speciﬁc instance that they
are presented with. Alternatively, the agent would focus on N θ when making inferences about the underlying domain Ω ,
given an assertion ‘x is θ ’.
By allowing different distance functions and thresholds for each label in LA we can model the semantic dependence
between labels by a joint distribution on the cross product space of threshold random variables. In this paper we have
discussed in detail two speciﬁc types of semantic dependence each of which results in a particular selection function for
mass values. These are total dependence where all threshold variables and distance metrics coincide and total independence
where all threshold variable are statistically independent. The semantic dependence being modelled here is based on the
relationship between the characteristics being described by the various labels, as represented by different conceptual spaces.
So for the consonant (dependent) model all labels describe the same characteristic, while for the independent model all
labels describe different completely independent characteristics. Intermediate cases of dependence may not result in a
selection function and consequently the resulting calculus for appropriateness measures will not be functional.
As already mentioned in Section 5.4.3 one of the most interesting and promising areas to be explored as part of future
studies are the richer models of semantic dependence allowed within the general framework proposed in Section 5.4. The
use of graphical approaches such as Bayesian networks to model the joint distribution on threshold variables, while not
necessarily resulting in a functional calculus, may provide computationally tractable methods for evaluating appropriateness
measures. Another potential avenue for research is the development of rule-based methods incorporating the label semantics
prototype theory. In this case new rule-learning methods could be investigated which combine clustering algorithms with
label semantics to provide the deﬁnition of natural description labels.
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